CS152: Programming Languages Lecture 12 — The Curry-Howard Isomorphism

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Curry-Howard Isomorphism

What we did:

- Define a programming language
- Define a type system to rule out programs we don't want

What logicians do:

- Define a logic (a way to state propositions)
 - Example: Propositional logic $p ::= b \mid p \land p \mid p \lor p \mid p \rightarrow p$

Define a proof system (a way to prove propositions)

But it turns out we did that too!

Slogans:

- "Propositions are Types"
- "Proofs are Programs"

A slight variant

Let's take the explicitly typed simply-typed lambda-calculus with:

- Any number of base types b_1, b_2, \ldots
- No constants (can add one or more if you want)
- Pairs
- Sums

$$e ::= x \mid \lambda x. e \mid e e$$

$$\mid (e, e) \mid e.1 \mid e.2$$

$$\mid A(e) \mid B(e) \mid \text{match } e \text{ with } Ax. e \mid Bx. e$$

$$\tau ::= b \mid \tau \rightarrow \tau \mid \tau * \tau \mid \tau + \tau$$

Even without constants, plenty of terms type-check with $\Gamma=\cdot\hdots$

$\lambda x: b_{17}. x$

has type

 $b_{17}
ightarrow b_{17}$

$\lambda x: b_1. \ \lambda f: b_1 \rightarrow b_2. \ f \ x$

has type

$b_1 ightarrow (b_1 ightarrow b_2) ightarrow b_2$

$\lambda x: b_1 \rightarrow b_2 \rightarrow b_3. \ \lambda y: b_2. \ \lambda z: b_1. \ x \ z \ y$

has type

$$(b_1
ightarrow b_2
ightarrow b_3)
ightarrow b_2
ightarrow b_1
ightarrow b_3$$

$\lambda x: b_1. (\mathsf{A}(x), \mathsf{A}(x))$

has type

$b_1 o ((b_1 + b_7) * (b_1 + b_4))$

$$\lambda f: b_1
ightarrow b_3. \ \lambda g: b_2
ightarrow b_3. \ \lambda z: b_1 + b_2. \ (ext{match } z ext{ with } extsf{Ax. } f extsf{x} \mid ext{Bx. } g extsf{x})$$

has type

$$(b_1
ightarrow b_3)
ightarrow (b_2
ightarrow b_3)
ightarrow (b_1 + b_2)
ightarrow b_3$$

$\lambda x: b_1 * b_2. \ \lambda y: b_3. \ ((y, x.1), x.2)$

has type

$$(b_1*b_2)
ightarrow b_3
ightarrow ((b_3*b_1)*b_2)$$

Empty and Nonempty Types

Have seen several "nonempty" types (closed terms of that type):

$$\begin{array}{l} b_{17} \rightarrow b_{17} \\ b_1 \rightarrow (b_1 \rightarrow b_2) \rightarrow b_2 \\ (b_1 \rightarrow b_2 \rightarrow b_3) \rightarrow b_2 \rightarrow b_1 \rightarrow b_3 \\ b_1 \rightarrow ((b_1 + b_7) * (b_1 + b_4)) \\ (b_1 \rightarrow b_3) \rightarrow (b_2 \rightarrow b_3) \rightarrow (b_1 + b_2) \rightarrow b_3 \\ (b_1 * b_2) \rightarrow b_3 \rightarrow ((b_3 * b_1) * b_2) \end{array}$$

There are also lots of "empty" types (no closed term of that type):

$$b_1 \qquad b_1
ightarrow b_2 \qquad b_1 + (b_1
ightarrow b_2) \qquad b_1
ightarrow (b_2
ightarrow b_1)
ightarrow b_2$$


And "I" have a "secret" way of knowing whether a type will be empty; let me show you propositional logic...

Propositional Logic

With \rightarrow for implies, + for inclusive-or and * for and:

$$egin{array}{lll} p & ::= & b \mid p
ightarrow p \mid p st p \mid p + p \ \Gamma & ::= & \cdot \mid \Gamma, p \end{array}$$

 $|\Gamma \vdash p|$



Guess what!!!!

That's *exactly* our type system, erasing terms and changing each au to a p

 $\Gamma \vdash e : \tau$

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash e_1: \tau_1 \quad \Gamma \vdash e_2: \tau_2}{\Gamma \vdash (e_1, e_2): \tau_1 * \tau_2} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash e: \tau_1 * \tau_2}{\Gamma \vdash e.1: \tau_1} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash e: \tau_1 * \tau_2}{\Gamma \vdash e.2: \tau_2}$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \tau_1}{\Gamma \vdash \mathsf{A}(e) : \tau_1 + \tau_2} \qquad \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \tau_2}{\Gamma \vdash \mathsf{B}(e) : \tau_1 + \tau_2}$$

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash e: \tau_1 + \tau_2 \quad \Gamma, x: \tau_1 \vdash e_1: \tau \quad \Gamma, y: \tau_2 \vdash e_2: \tau}{\Gamma \vdash \mathsf{match} \; e \; \mathsf{with} \; \mathsf{A}x. \; e_1 \mid \mathsf{B}y. \; e_2: \tau}$

 $\frac{\Gamma(x)=\tau}{\Gamma\vdash x:\tau} \qquad \frac{\Gamma,x:\tau_1\vdash e:\tau_2}{\Gamma\vdash \lambda x.\ e:\tau_1\to\tau_2} \qquad \frac{\Gamma\vdash e_1:\tau_2\to\tau_1\quad \Gamma\vdash e_2:\tau_2}{\Gamma\vdash e_1\ e_2:\tau_1}$

Curry-Howard Isomorphism

- Given a well-typed closed term, take the typing derivation, erase the terms, and have a propositional-logic proof
- Given a propositional-logic proof, there exists a closed term with that type
- A term that type-checks is a proof it tells you exactly how to derive the logic formula corresponding to its type
- Constructive (hold that thought) propositional logic and simply-typed lambda-calculus with pairs and sums are the same thing.
 - Computation and logic are *deeply* connected
 - λ is no more or less made up than implication
- Revisit our examples under the logical interpretation...

$\lambda x:b_{17}. x$

is a proof that

 $b_{17}
ightarrow b_{17}$

$\lambda x: b_1. \ \lambda f: b_1 o b_2. \ f \ x$

is a proof that

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$b_1 o ((b_1 + b_7) * (b_1 + b_4))$

$$\lambda f: b_1 o b_3. \ \lambda g: b_2 o b_3. \ \lambda z: b_1 + b_2.$$

(match z with Ax. $f \ x \mid \mathsf{Bx.} \ g \ x)$

is a proof that

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is a proof that

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ightarrow b_3
ightarrow ((b_3 * b_1) * b_2)$$

Why care?

Because:

- This is just fascinating (glad I'm not a dog)
- Don't think of logic and computing as distinct fields
- Thinking "the other way" can help you know what's possible/impossible
- Can form the basis for automated theorem provers
- Type systems should not be *ad hoc* piles of rules!

So, every typed λ -calculus is a proof system for some logic...

Is STLC with pairs and sums a *complete* proof system for propositional logic? Almost...

Classical vs. Constructive

Classical propositional logic has the "law of the excluded middle":

$$\Gamma \vdash p_1 + (p_1 \to p_2)$$

(Think " $p + \neg p$ " – also equivalent to double-negation $\neg \neg p
ightarrow p$)

STLC has no proof for this; no closed expression has this type

Logics without this rule are called *constructive*. They're useful because proofs "know how the world is" and "are executable" and "produce examples"

Can still "branch on possibilities" by making the excluded middle an explicit assumption:

$$((p_1 + (p_1 \rightarrow p_2)) * (p_1 \rightarrow p_3) * ((p_1 \rightarrow p_2) \rightarrow p_3)) \rightarrow p_3$$

Theorem: I can wake up at 9AM and get to campus by 10AM.

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Proof: If it is a weekday, I can take a bus that leaves at 9:30AM. If it is not a weekday, traffic is light and I can drive. Since it is a weekday or not a weekday, I can get to campus by 10AM.

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Problem: If you wake up and don't know day it is, this proof does not let you construct a plan to get to campus by 10AM.

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In constructive logic, that never happens. You can always extract a program from a proof that "does" what you proved "could be"

You can't prove the theorem above, but you can prove, "If I know whether it is a weekday or not, then I can get to campus by 10AM"

A "non-terminating proof" is no proof at all

Remember the typing rule for fix:

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash e: \tau \to \tau}{\Gamma \vdash \mathsf{fix} \; e: \tau}$

That let's us prove anything! Example: fix $\lambda x:b_3$. x has type b_3

So the "logic" is *inconsistent* (and therefore worthless)

Related: In ML, a value of type 'a never terminates normally (raises an exception, infinite loop, etc.)

let rec f x = f xlet z = f 0

Last word on Curry-Howard

It's not just STLC and constructive propositional logic

Every logic has a corresponding typed λ calculus (and no consistent logic has something as "powerful" as **fix**).

Example: When we add universal types ("generics") in a few lectures, that corresponds to adding universal quantification

If you remember one thing: the typing rule for function application is *modus ponens*